Parliamentary System & Federal System of Government

PART A: Parliamentary System of Government

1. Features of the Parliamentary System

India adopted the parliamentary system from the British Westminster model. The key features are:

1.1 Nominal and Real Executives

• The President is the nominal (de jure / titular) executive — head of state but does not actually govern.
• The Prime Minister and Cabinet are the real (de facto) executive — they exercise actual executive powers.
• Art. 74 makes Cabinet advice binding on the President (post-44th Amendment).

1.2 Majority Party Rule

• The political party (or coalition) that commands a majority in Lok Sabha forms the government.
• The leader of that majority is appointed PM by the President.
• The government continues as long as it retains Lok Sabha confidence.

1.3 Collective Responsibility (Art. 75(3))

• The cornerstone of parliamentary government: the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.
• "Sink or swim together" — if Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion, the entire Cabinet must resign.
• A minister who publicly disagrees with a Cabinet decision must resign.

1.4 Political Homogeneity

• All Cabinet members generally belong to the same party (or have an agreed common minimum programme in a coalition).
• This ensures unity of policy and purpose in government.
• In coalition governments, political homogeneity may be strained — a major challenge for India since 1989.

1.5 Double Membership (Ministers Must Be MPs)

• Ministers must be members of Parliament (either House). If a non-MP is appointed minister, they must obtain parliamentary membership within 6 months (Art. 75(5)).
• This ensures executive accountability to the legislature — ministers can be questioned on the floor of Parliament.
• This is a key distinction from the presidential system where cabinet secretaries need not be legislators.

1.6 Leadership of the Prime Minister

• The PM is the primus inter pares — first among equals — and the leader of the Cabinet, Parliament, and the ruling party.
• The PM sets the agenda for Cabinet meetings, reshuffles the Cabinet, and is the chief spokesperson of the government.
• All ministers hold office during the President's pleasure — effectively the PM's pleasure.

1.7 Dissolution of the Lower House

• The PM can advise the President to dissolve Lok Sabha before the expiry of its 5-year term.
• This is a powerful weapon — the government can choose an opportune moment to seek a fresh mandate.
• The President may refuse dissolution advice if an alternative majority is available (rare; discussed in Samsher Singh case).

1.8 Secrecy of Proceedings (Oath of Secrecy)

• Ministers take an oath of secrecy before the President (Art. 75(4)) — they cannot divulge Cabinet discussions.
• Cabinet proceedings are secret to ensure free and frank deliberation — ministers can argue internally but must present a unified front publicly.
• This secrecy is a constitutional requirement, unlike conventions in some other systems.

2. Parliamentary vs Presidential System — Comparison

3. Merits of Parliamentary System in India

3.1 Represents Diverse Groups

India is an extraordinarily diverse country — in terms of religion, caste, language, region, and ethnicity. The parliamentary system allows coalition governments that can represent this diversity. Different parties representing different communities can come together to form the government, ensuring broader representation than a single presidential candidate can offer.

3.2 Responsible and Accountable Government

• The executive is continuously accountable to the elected legislature — through Question Hour, debates, committee scrutiny, and ultimately the vote of no-confidence.
• This accountability is ongoing and daily, not limited to elections every few years.
• Prevents the exercise of unchecked executive power between elections.

3.3 Prevents Authoritarianism

• The requirement of legislative confidence means no government can become a dictatorship — it can be removed by Parliament at any time.
• Collective responsibility ensures no single person (not even PM) can act unilaterally without Cabinet support.
• In a presidential system, a determined president with a majority can more easily accumulate power.

3.4 Flexible Policy-Making

• Parliamentary system allows rapid policy change in response to changing circumstances — no need to wait for a fixed term to end.
• A government that loses public confidence can be quickly replaced, allowing the nation to adapt.
• A presidential system may create gridlock when the executive and legislature are controlled by different parties (divided government — common in US).

3.5 Why the Constituent Assembly Chose It

• Familiarity: Indians had experience with parliamentary institutions during British rule — provincial assemblies, the Central Legislative Assembly, the Interim Government (1946–47). The presidential system was alien.
• Suited to India's diversity: Coalition possibilities under parliamentarism were seen as better for managing India's pluralism than a single directly-elected president.
• B.N. Rau's recommendation: Sir B.N. Rau (Constitutional Advisor) recommended the parliamentary model after studying constitutions of various countries. The Constituent Assembly largely accepted his recommendations.
• Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's view: Ambedkar argued that a responsible government (accountable to legislature) was more important than stable government. Stability without responsibility is undesirable.
• Congress experience: The Indian National Congress had worked within Westminster-style legislatures and was most comfortable with this model.

4. Demerits of Parliamentary System

4.1 Instability — Especially in Coalition Era

• The government can be removed at any time by a no-confidence vote. Post-1989, India entered an era of coalition governments — many were unstable (V.P. Singh 1989–90, H.D. Deve Gowda 1996–97, I.K. Gujral 1997–98, Vajpayee 1999 — fell by 1 vote).
• Frequent elections and government changes disrupt policy continuity and governance.

4.2 Spoils System (Patronage Politics)

• Allocation of ministerial portfolios based on political considerations (caste, region, party loyalty) rather than merit or expertise.
• Coalition arithmetic leads to unsuitable persons holding key portfolios — senior ministers may control ministries they know little about.
• 91st Amendment (15% cap) partially addressed this but did not solve portfolio quality.

4.3 Cabinet Dictatorship

• Paradoxically, with a strong majority, a parliamentary government can become a Cabinet dictatorship — if the PM dominates, collective responsibility becomes a rubber stamp rather than a genuine check.
• The Emergency period (1975–77) under Indira Gandhi — Parliament was subservient to the executive; the Cabinet was effectively bypassed by a "kitchen cabinet."
• A strong PM with overwhelming majority (e.g., Rajiv Gandhi 1984 with 404 seats) faces minimal legislative opposition.

4.4 Anti-Defection Doesn't Cure All Ills

• The 10th Schedule (52nd Amendment 1985) introduced anti-defection — MLAs/MPs lose membership if they vote against party whip.
• But this has its own problems: it suppresses dissent, makes MPs mere party instruments, and reduces individual legislative accountability.
• Floor-crossing is replaced by wholesale party defection (split rule was misused until 91st Amendment 2003 removed it — now mergers only if 2/3 members agree).

5. Why India Chose Parliamentary Over Presidential

5.1 Constituent Assembly Debates — Key Arguments

5.2 Dr. Ambedkar's Defence of Parliamentary System

In the Constituent Assembly (November 1949), Ambedkar specifically compared the two systems and concluded: "A democratic executive must satisfy two conditions: it must be a stable executive and it must be a responsible executive. Unfortunately it has not been possible to devise a system which can ensure both simultaneously." He chose responsibility over stability because an irresponsible but stable government is worse than an unstable but responsible one.

PART B: Federal System of Government

6. Features of a Federal Constitution

A federal constitution, in its classical sense (K.C. Wheare's definition), has the following essential features:

7. Federal Features of the Indian Constitution

7.1 Dual Polity

India has a dual polity — there are two sets of governments operating over the same territory: the Central (Union) Government and the State Governments. Each has its own legislature, executive, and (partly) judiciary. Citizens are governed by laws of both levels simultaneously.

7.2 Division of Powers (Art. 246 + 7th Schedule)

7.3 Independent Judiciary

• The Supreme Court acts as the constitutional umpire — adjudicates Centre-State and Inter-State disputes.
• Judges have security of tenure; cannot be removed easily; not accountable to either Centre or States in the exercise of judicial functions.
• Art. 131 gives the SC original jurisdiction in Centre-State and State-State disputes.

7.4 Bicameral Parliament

• Rajya Sabha (Council of States) represents the states in Parliament. Each state is represented in proportion to its population.
• Rajya Sabha has special powers under Art. 249 (pass a resolution allowing Parliament to legislate on State List subjects) and Art. 312 (create new All-India Services).

7.5 Written and Rigid Constitution

• India has a written constitution — the longest in the world (~145,000 words, 470 articles, 12 Schedules, 5 appendices).
• Federal provisions (affecting Centre-State relations) require the special amendment procedure of Art. 368 — 2/3 majority in each House + ratification by at least half the state legislatures.
• Other provisions can be amended by simple majority of Parliament (not truly "rigid" — a unitary feature).

7.6 Supremacy of Constitution

The Constitution is the supreme law. Both Central and State laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution can be struck down by the judiciary. Neither Parliament nor State legislatures are sovereign in the British sense — they are both subordinate to the Constitution.

8. Unitary Features of the Indian Constitution (Tilt Towards Centre)

Despite its federal structure, India has numerous features that give the Centre overwhelming dominance over the States. These are often called "unitary features" or "centralising tendencies."

8.1 Single Citizenship

Unlike true federations (USA, Australia), India has single citizenship — there is no separate state citizenship. All Indians are citizens of India, not of any particular state. This promotes national unity but reduces the independent identity of states.

8.2 Flexible Constitution (Partly)

While federal provisions require states' ratification, a large number of constitutional provisions can be amended by Parliament alone by a 2/3 majority — without state consent. This gives Parliament enormous power to reshape the Constitution unilaterally.

8.3 Integrated Judiciary (Single Judicial Hierarchy)

Unlike the USA (separate federal and state court systems), India has a single integrated judicial system — the Supreme Court at the top, High Courts below, and District Courts at the bottom. High Courts are under the supervision of the SC. States do not have separate court hierarchies — a unitary feature.

8.4 All-India Services (AIS)

• IAS, IPS, and IFoS officers serve both Centre and States but are recruited, trained, and ultimately controlled by the Centre (DoPT).
• The Centre can and does deploy AIS officers in states, giving it influence over state administration.
• Art. 312 — Parliament (Rajya Sabha by 2/3 resolution) can create new AIS.

8.5 Emergency Provisions — Parliament Takes Over States

8.6 Appointment of Governor by Centre

• The Governor is appointed by the President (i.e., on the advice of the Union Cabinet) and serves at the pleasure of the President (Art. 155, 156).
• The Governor acts as the Centre's agent in the state — can withhold assent to state bills, recommend President's Rule, and exercise discretion on government formation.
• This is a major unitary feature — states have no role in selecting their own Governor.

8.7 Parliament Can Change State Boundaries

• Under Art. 3, Parliament can create new states, increase/decrease the area or boundary of states, and change the name of states — without the consent of the state legislature (only consultation required, not consent).
• In a true federation, the territorial integrity of states is constitutionally guaranteed. India lacks this guarantee.
• Examples: Creation of Telangana (2014), Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand (2000), Jammu & Kashmir reorganisation (2019 — state converted to two UTs).

8.8 Residuary Powers with Centre

Unlike Canada (residuary with provinces in certain respects) and USA (10th Amendment — powers not given to federal govt reserved to states), in India the residuary powers vest with Parliament (Art. 248 + Union List Entry 97). Any matter not covered by the three lists is Parliament's domain.

8.9 Rajya Sabha — Less Powerful Upper House

• Unlike the US Senate (equal representation for all states, very powerful), Rajya Sabha has unequal state representation (larger states have more seats).
• Money Bills can be passed by Lok Sabha alone — Rajya Sabha can only suggest amendments (which LS can reject) and delay for 14 days.
• On most legislation, in case of deadlock, a joint session is convened — Lok Sabha's larger numbers dominate.

8.10 No Right to Secede

States have no right to secede from the Indian Union. The Constitution does not recognise any right to separation. The "indestructible Union of destructible states" (Granville Austin's phrase) captures this — the Union is permanent but state boundaries can be redrawn by Parliament.

9. K.C. Wheare's Classification — Quasi-Federal

9.1 K.C. Wheare's View

Professor K.C. Wheare, the foremost authority on federal constitutions, classified India's Constitution as "quasi-federal" — it has federal features in its structure but is federal in form and unitary in spirit.

"The Indian Union is a unitary state with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features." — K.C. Wheare

9.2 Other Scholarly Views

9.3 The Supreme Court on Indian Federalism

10. Cooperative Federalism

10.1 Concept

Cooperative federalism refers to the model where the Centre and States collaborate as equal partners to achieve shared national goals, rather than operating in a purely competitive or hierarchical manner. It contrasts with "competitive federalism" (states competing with each other for investment) and "coercive federalism" (Centre imposing its will on states).

10.2 Institutional Mechanisms for Cooperative Federalism

Inter-State Council (Art. 263)

• Art. 263 empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council for enquiring into and advising on inter-state disputes.
• The ISC was established in 1990 (following Sarkaria Commission recommendation) under the Chairmanship of the PM.
• Composition: PM, all Chief Ministers, 6 Cabinet Ministers from Centre.
• Not a permanent body with executive powers — advisory only, but important for Centre-State dialogue.

GST Council (Art. 279A)

• Established by the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016, which inserted Art. 279A.
• Chaired by Union Finance Minister; members include State Finance Ministers.
• Makes recommendations on GST rates, exemptions, and administration — decisions require 3/4 majority (Centre has 1/3 vote; all states together have 2/3).
• Considered a landmark cooperative federalism institution — first constitutional body with built-in equal partnership structure.
• SC in Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022): GST Council's recommendations are not binding on Union or States — they are persuasive. States and Centre are equal in GST governance.

Finance Commission (Art. 280)

• Constituted every 5 years; recommends devolution of Central taxes to states (vertical devolution) and distribution among states (horizontal devolution).
• 15th Finance Commission (2020–21 to 2025–26): recommended 41% share of divisible pool to states (42% was 14th FC's figure; 1% deducted for J&K as newly created UT).

NITI Aayog (Replacing Planning Commission)

• Planning Commission was abolished in 2014; NITI Aayog established in January 2015 as a think-tank.
• Key difference: Planning Commission allocated funds (fiscal federalism from Centre to States); NITI Aayog only advises — it has no financial powers.
• NITI Aayog's Governing Council includes all CMs — designed to be a platform for cooperative federalism.
• Critics: Transfer of fund allocation to Finance Ministry/Finance Commission has reduced states' ability to plan independently.

10.3 Competitive Federalism

India has also seen competitive federalism — states competing to attract investment by offering better infrastructure, ease of doing business, lower taxes. NITI Aayog's rankings (SDG Index, Governance Index, Export Preparedness Index) encourage this competition. While healthy, it can also lead to a "race to the bottom" on labour/environmental standards.

11. Sarkaria Commission (1983–87)

11.1 Background and Constitution

• Set up in 1983 by the Indira Gandhi government to review Centre-State relations.
• Chaired by Justice R.S. Sarkaria (retired judge of Supreme Court). Other members: S.R. Sen (economist) and B. Sivaraman (ICS).
• Submitted its report in 1987 — 247 recommendations covering all aspects of Centre-State relations.
• Context: Growing demands from states (especially non-Congress states) for greater autonomy; complaints about misuse of Art. 356; tensions over AIS, Governor's role, etc.

11.2 Key Recommendations

11.3 Implementation Status

12. Punchhi Commission (2007–10)

12.1 Background and Constitution

• Set up in April 2007 by the Manmohan Singh government — 20 years after Sarkaria — to revisit Centre-State relations in light of changed realities (liberalisation, coalition era, globalisation, devolution post-73rd/74th Amendments).
• Chaired by Justice M.M. Punchhi (former Chief Justice of India). Submitted report in March 2010 — 7 volumes.
• Key difference from Sarkaria: Punchhi focused more on the third tier (local governments) and contemporary issues like natural resource management, national security, environment.

12.2 Key Recommendations

• Art. 355 and 356 Reform: Art. 355 (Centre's duty to protect states from internal disturbance) should be amended — "internal disturbance" should be replaced by "armed rebellion" (already done for Art. 352 by 44th Amendment; Punchhi recommended similar change in Art. 355). President's Rule should be for a maximum of 3 months in first instance; only after 6 months should Parliament extend.
• Local Governments as Third Tier: Local governments (Panchayats and urban bodies) should be treated as a third tier of the federal system — not merely creatures of state governments. Devolution of functions, functionaries, and funds to local bodies should be constitutionally mandated.
• Natural Resources Management: A clear National Policy on natural resources (minerals, water, forests) should be formulated through Centre-State consultation — states have grievances about sharing revenues from natural resources on their territory.
• Environment and Climate: Environment being in the Concurrent List, there should be a clearer framework for Centre-State cooperation; states should have more voice in national environmental policy.
• Coastal Management: Coastal states should have greater jurisdiction over the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) for fisheries, coastal development — currently mainly with Centre under Union List (high seas, fishing beyond territorial waters).
• Governor's Role: Reiterated Sarkaria — Governor's term should be 5 years (not at President's pleasure); removal of Governor should require consultation with CM; Governor's report for Art. 356 must be objective and complete.
• Economic and Social Planning: Planning should be a truly cooperative Centre-State exercise — NITI Aayog should have constitutional backing and real power to consult states.

12.3 Key Distinction: Sarkaria vs Punchhi

13. Prelims PYQs

14. Mains PYQs

15. 15-Minute Revision Box