Anti-Defection Law, Elections, Political Parties & Pressure Groups
The 10th Schedule — enacted by the 52nd Amendment 1985 — is one of the most tested areas of UPSC Polity. From Kihoto Hollohan to the Nabam Rebia and Subhash Desai judgments, from party recognition criteria to Electoral Bonds being struck down in 2024, and from coalition dynamics to pressure group typology — this topic is a high-yield goldmine for both Prelims and Mains GS-II.
On this page
- Conceptual Clarity
- 10th Schedule — Anti-Defection Law
- Grounds for Disqualification
- Exceptions — Not Disqualified
- Speaker's Role & Judicial Review
- Key Cases — Anti-Defection
- Political Parties — Registration & Recognition
- Party Funding & Electoral Bonds
- Coalition Government
- Pressure Groups — Types & Methods
- Prelims PYQs
- Mains PYQs
- Revision Box — 4 UPSC Traps
Conceptual Clarity — Why Anti-Defection & Party Law Matter
The 10th Schedule was inserted to cure the malaise of "Aaya Ram Gaya Ram" politics — rampant floor-crossing that destabilised governments in the 1960s–70s. A legislator is elected on a party ticket; if they switch parties, the voters' mandate is betrayed. The law penalises such betrayal with disqualification from the legislature. Simultaneously, strong political parties, transparent funding, and organised pressure groups are the pillars of a healthy democracy — all heavily tested in UPSC GS-II.
- 10th Schedule: Added by 52nd Amendment 1985; governs disqualification for defection.
- 91st Amendment 2003: Plugged the "split" loophole (1/3 members) — only genuine merger (2/3) is now an exception.
- RPA 1951 Section 29A: Governs registration of political parties with ECI.
- Electoral Bonds: Struck down by SC in February 2024 — Art. 19(1)(a) violation.
1. 10th Schedule — The Anti-Defection Law
1.1 Historical Background
The phrase "Aaya Ram Gaya Ram" entered Indian political vocabulary in 1967 when Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed parties three times in a single day. This symbolised the instability caused by floor-crossing. The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, enacted during the Rajiv Gandhi government, inserted the 10th Schedule into the Constitution to disqualify legislators who defect from their party.
1.2 Scope and Application
- Applies to members of both Houses of Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) and members of State Legislatures (Vidhan Sabha and Vidhan Parishad).
- Does not apply to independent members or nominated members who join a party within 6 months of being nominated (an independent who joins a party is disqualified; a nominated member who joins within 6 months is allowed).
- Decision on disqualification: by the Chairman of Rajya Sabha / Speaker of Lok Sabha / Speaker of State Legislature — as the case may be.
2. Grounds for Disqualification
A member of a House is disqualified on two grounds under the 10th Schedule:
2.1 Ground 1 — Voluntary Giving Up of Membership (Para 2(1)(a))
- If a member voluntarily gives up the membership of his/her political party, they are disqualified.
- The word "voluntarily" is crucial — the SC has held (in Ravi Naik v. Union of India, 1994) that voluntarily giving up does not necessarily mean formal resignation. Conduct, statements, and actions that unambiguously indicate a member has given up party membership can also attract disqualification.
- Example: If a BJP MP publicly campaigns for the Congress candidate in a by-election, this may amount to voluntarily giving up BJP membership even without formal resignation.
2.2 Ground 2 — Voting Contrary to Party Whip (Para 2(1)(b))
- If a member votes or abstains from voting in the legislature contrary to any direction issued by the political party (i.e., a whip) without the prior permission of the party, they are disqualified.
- The party must have not condoned such voting/abstention within 15 days.
- "Prior permission" is the key escape valve — if the party gives prior permission to vote against a whip, no disqualification results.
- Three-line whip is the most stringent — member must attend and vote as directed.
3. Exceptions — Who is NOT Disqualified
3.1 Merger Exception (Para 4) — The Only Surviving Exception
A member is not disqualified if their legislature party merges with another political party and the merger is supported by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the total membership of the legislature party.
- Both the original party and the merged party must recognise the merger.
- Example: If a party has 30 MLAs, at least 20 (2/3) must agree to merge for the merger exception to apply. The remaining 10 who do not agree are NOT disqualified either — they can claim to be the original party.
- The merger must happen at the level of the original political party (not just the legislature party) — this is a debated point.
3.2 Speaker / Chairman Exception (Para 5)
A member who is elected as the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha / Vidhan Sabha, or Chairman or Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha / Vidhan Parishad is not disqualified if they:
- Voluntarily give up membership of their party on being elected as Speaker/Chairman (by convention, the Speaker is expected to act impartially).
- Rejoin the party immediately after ceasing to be Speaker/Chairman.
3.3 What Was Removed — The "Split" Provision (Original Para 3)
4. Speaker's Role & Judicial Review
4.1 The Decision-Maker
Under Para 6 of the 10th Schedule, the Speaker / Chairman of the relevant House is the sole authority to decide petitions for disqualification. Their decision is final.
- The Speaker acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when deciding disqualification petitions.
- There is no specified time limit in the Constitution for the Speaker to decide — leading to deliberate delays (a major criticism).
- The Speaker can refer the matter to the Election Commission for opinion on the identity of the original party.
4.2 Original Para 7 — Ouster of Courts
The original Para 7 of the 10th Schedule stated that no court shall have jurisdiction with respect to any matter connected with the disqualification of a member. This was intended to make the Speaker's decision final and non-justiciable.
4.3 Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Landmark Ruling
| Aspect | Ruling |
|---|---|
| Para 7 validity | Struck down as unconstitutional — violates basic structure of the Constitution (specifically, the principle of judicial review and rule of law) |
| Speaker's decision | Speaker's final decision IS subject to judicial review by the High Court and Supreme Court under Art. 226 and Art. 136 respectively |
| Scope of review | Courts will only review on grounds of: mala fide, perversity, violation of natural justice, or constitutional infirmity — not on merits |
| Speaker's status | Recognised as a Tribunal for purposes of the 10th Schedule — subject to writ jurisdiction |
| 10th Schedule validity | Upheld as constitutionally valid (5:3 majority) |
5. Key Cases — Anti-Defection Law
| Case | Year | Court | Key Ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu | 1992 | SC (5-judge) | Para 7 struck down (violates basic structure — judicial review). 10th Schedule upheld. Speaker's final decision subject to SC/HC review on limited grounds. |
| Ravi Naik v. Union of India | 1994 | SC | "Voluntarily giving up membership" does not require formal resignation — conduct/actions sufficient. Expanded scope of Para 2(1)(a). |
| Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh | 2016 | SC (5-judge) | Speaker facing a notice of removal motion CANNOT decide disqualification petitions — conflict of interest. Speaker's authority to disqualify is suspended while removal motion is pending. Critical for governance. |
| Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra | 2023 | SC (5-judge) | Maharashtra political crisis (Shiv Sena split, 2022). Speaker's decision on disqualification final but subject to review. Governor's invitation to Eknath Shinde faction to form govt was constitutionally wrong. Ordered new Speaker to decide disqualification petitions; recommended fresh elections to resolve political dispute. Majority-minority determination within party — complex analysis. |
| Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur | 2020 | SC | SC directed Speaker to decide disqualification petition within 4 weeks — first time SC set a deadline for Speaker. Recognised delay as an abuse of the process. |
6. Political Parties — Registration & Recognition
6.1 Registration with Election Commission of India
Political parties are registered under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 with the Election Commission of India (ECI). Key requirements:
- The party must have its constitution/rules in writing.
- It must subscribe to the principles of socialism, secularism, and democracy and uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.
- The party must not be associated with or propagate violence.
- Registration gives the party legal status; recognition gives additional benefits.
6.2 Recognition as a National Party
A party is recognised as a National Party if it fulfils any ONE of the following criteria:
- Secures at least 6% of valid votes polled in any four or more states in a general election to Lok Sabha or state assemblies, AND wins at least 4 seats in the Lok Sabha; OR
- Wins at least 2% of seats in the Lok Sabha from at least 3 different states — currently 2% of 543 = approximately 11 seats; OR
- Is recognised as a State Party in at least 4 states.
6.3 Recognition as a State Party
A party is recognised as a State Party in a state if it fulfils any ONE of the following:
- Secures at least 6% of valid votes in the state at a general election to the state assembly AND wins at least 2 seats in the state assembly; OR
- Wins at least 3% of seats in the state assembly (minimum 3 seats); OR
- Wins at least 1 seat in Lok Sabha for every 25 Lok Sabha seats allotted to that state (or fraction thereof); OR
- Secures at least 8% of valid votes polled in the state at a general election to the Lok Sabha or state assembly.
6.4 Benefits of Recognition
| Benefit | National Party | State Party |
|---|---|---|
| Election Symbol | Reserved symbol across India | Reserved symbol in that state |
| Free broadcast time | Doordarshan & AIR — national broadcast | Doordarshan & AIR — state broadcast |
| Free copies of electoral rolls | All states | That state only |
| Star campaigners | Up to 40 star campaigners | Up to 20 star campaigners |
| Nomination papers | 1 proposer sufficient | 1 proposer sufficient |
6.5 National Parties (as of 2024)
After ECI's delisting exercise, the following parties hold National Party status: BJP, INC, CPI(M), CPI, BSP, NCP (factional disputes — SC/Ajit Pawar factions), TMC. Note: TMC lost and regained national party status. NCP status is under dispute after the 2023 split. The list changes based on electoral performance reviewed after every general election.
6.6 Inner-Party Democracy
- Unlike the USA, India has no legal requirement for internal elections within political parties.
- The ECI can direct parties to hold organisational elections (advisory), but compliance is uneven.
- Law Commission (2015) recommended statutory provisions for inner-party democracy.
- Political parties are not treated as "state" under Art. 12 — SC held in Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) that parties are not amenable to writ jurisdiction for internal matters.
7. Party Funding & Electoral Bonds
7.1 Sources of Party Funding
- Membership fees — negligible in practice.
- Individual donations — disclosed above Rs. 20,000; parties file returns with ECI.
- Corporate donations — under Section 182 of Companies Act 2013; disclosed in audited accounts; earlier limit of 7.5% of average net profit removed in 2017.
- Electoral Trusts — set up under ECI scheme; transparent pass-through mechanism for corporate donations.
- Electoral Bonds — now struck down (see below).
- State funding of elections — debates ongoing; 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) recommended partial state funding; Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommended state funding of recognised parties.
7.2 Electoral Bonds — Struck Down (February 2024)
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| What it was | Promissory notes purchased from SBI branches and donated anonymously to political parties; parties could encash at any SBI branch |
| Introduced | Finance Act 2017 (treated as Money Bill — also controversial); operational from 2018 |
| Anonymity feature | Donor's identity known only to SBI; not disclosed to public or ECI |
| SC Case | Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) — 5-judge Constitution Bench, unanimous verdict |
| Date of judgment | 15 February 2024 |
| Grounds for striking down | (1) Violated Art. 19(1)(a) — right to information of voters about political funding; (2) Anonymity enables quid pro quo corruption; (3) Informational privacy of donor does not override voters' right to know |
| Direction | SBI directed to stop issuing bonds; parties to disclose all bond data; SBI to submit bond details to ECI |
7.3 Inner-Party Democracy & Transparency
- ECI can request parties to file annual accounts; parties registered under Section 29A are exempt from income tax (Section 13A of Income Tax Act).
- No RTI on political parties — SC in Subhash Aggarwal v. ECI (2013) held ECI is a public authority but parties themselves are not directly covered under RTI; ECI had declared 6 national parties as public authorities in 2013 but parties challenged this.
- ADR (Association for Democratic Reforms) and RTI activists continue to push for party transparency.
8. Coalition Government
8.1 Features of Coalition Government
- A government formed by a coalition (alliance) of multiple political parties, none of which has an outright majority on its own.
- Parties come together through a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) — a negotiated policy document outlining agreed-upon priorities.
- The government must regularly demonstrate majority through floor tests under Art. 75(3) — collective responsibility to Lok Sabha.
- Cabinet portfolios are distributed among coalition partners — reducing the PM's free hand in Cabinet formation.
8.2 India's Coalition Experience
| Period | Coalition | Key Feature |
|---|---|---|
| 1977–79 | Janata Party | First non-Congress govt; heterogeneous coalition; collapsed due to internal contradictions |
| 1989–91 | National Front (VP Singh); Chandrashekar govt | Outside support by BJP/Left; unstable |
| 1996–98 | United Front (Deve Gowda, I.K. Gujral) | 13-party coalition; Congress outside support; two PMs in 2 years |
| 1998–2004 | National Democratic Alliance (NDA-I) | BJP-led; 24+ parties; Vajpayee government; fell by 1 vote in 1999 |
| 2004–2014 | United Progressive Alliance (UPA-I, II) | Congress-led; CMP; Left support withdrawn 2008 (nuclear deal); DMK, NCP, TMC as partners |
| 2014–2024 | NDA-II, NDA-III (BJP majority/coalition) | BJP alone had majority 2014, 2019; 2024 — NDA coalition dependent on TDP, JD(U) |
8.3 Challenges of Coalition Government
Policy Challenges
- Policy paralysis — lowest common denominator decisions
- CMP may be vague or contradictory
- Coalition partners can veto reforms (e.g., Left vetoing FDI in UPA-I)
- Delayed economic reforms (disinvestment, subsidies)
Governance Challenges
- Horse trading and instability (no-confidence motions)
- Compromised Cabinet formation — portfolios given for political reasons
- Collective responsibility weakens — partners dissent publicly without resigning
- Anti-defection law does not prevent coalition partners from withdrawing support
8.4 Constitutional Provisions
- Art. 75(3) — CoM collectively responsible to Lok Sabha; floor test required.
- Art. 75(2) — Ministers hold office during President's pleasure (i.e., PM's confidence).
- No-confidence motion (Art. 118 read with LS Rules) — minimum 10 days notice; passed by simple majority.
- S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — majority must be proved on the floor of the House, not by Governor's subjective assessment — limits Governor's power to dismiss state governments; also protects coalition CMs.
9. Pressure Groups — Types & Methods
9.1 Definition and Distinction from Political Parties
Pressure groups (also called interest groups) are organisations that seek to influence public policy and government decisions without directly contesting elections or forming governments. Unlike political parties, they do not seek political power directly — they influence those who hold power.
| Feature | Political Party | Pressure Group |
|---|---|---|
| Contest elections | Yes — to win power | No — to influence power |
| Membership | Broad-based, ideological | Narrow, interest-based |
| Accountability | Public accountability through elections | Less publicly accountable |
| Organisation | Formal, registered | Varies — formal to spontaneous |
| Scope | All issues of governance | Specific sectoral interests |
9.2 Classification of Pressure Groups
Gabriel Almond's typology (most cited in UPSC) classifies pressure groups into three broad types:
9.3 Major Associational Pressure Groups in India
| Type | Organisation | Affiliation/Nature |
|---|---|---|
| Trade Unions | INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress) | Congress-affiliated |
| AITUC (All India Trade Union Congress) | CPI-affiliated | |
| BMS (Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh) | RSS/BJP-affiliated; largest TU in India | |
| Business/Industry | FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) | Oldest business association (1927) |
| CII (Confederation of Indian Industry) | Industry-focused; more technical | |
| ASSOCHAM (Associated Chambers of Commerce) | Third major business body | |
| Professional | BCI (Bar Council of India) | Lawyers' statutory body |
| IMA (Indian Medical Association) | Doctors' association | |
| Peasant/Agrarian | AIKS (All India Kisan Sabha) | CPI(M)-affiliated |
| Shetkari Sanghatana | Maharashtra farmers; Sharad Joshi led | |
| Religious/Social | VHP, RSS (Sangh Parivar); Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind | Ideological/religious interest |
9.4 Methods of Pressure Groups
Direct Methods
- Lobbying: Direct contact with legislators, ministers, and bureaucrats to influence decisions.
- Submission of memoranda: Presenting demands to government.
- Electioneering: Supporting or opposing candidates; funding campaigns.
- Strikes and bandhs: Economic pressure (trade unions, farmers).
- Demonstrations and marches: Mass mobilisation (e.g., farmers' protests 2020–21).
Indirect Methods
- Public opinion campaigns: Media campaigns, social media, awareness drives.
- Public Interest Litigation (PIL): Judicial route to influence policy (e.g., ADR PILs on electoral bonds, party transparency).
- Propaganda: Publications, research reports, think-tanks.
- Alliance with parties: Providing vote banks or financial support to sympathetic parties.
- International pressure: Engaging international organisations (e.g., trade unions with ILO).
9.5 Role and Criticism
Positive Role
- Articulate and aggregate sectoral interests not captured by political parties.
- Check on governmental arbitrariness — watchdog role.
- Educate public and inform policymakers with specialised knowledge.
- Strengthen participatory democracy beyond elections.
- Complement legislative process with expert inputs.
Criticisms
- Represent narrow sectoral interests — not general public good.
- Wealthy pressure groups have disproportionate influence (corporate lobbying).
- Can be undemocratic and unaccountable — no electoral check.
- Can cause policy distortion — "regulatory capture."
- Anomic groups (riots, mob pressure) can undermine rule of law.
10. Prelims PYQs
With reference to the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which of the following statements is correct?
Answer: The Tenth Schedule was added by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. It provides for disqualification of members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the ground of defection from their political parties.
With reference to anti-defection law in India, consider the following statements: (1) The law allows a party to merge with another party by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of its legislature party. (2) The law does not apply to nominated members of the legislature. (3) The original provision allowing split (one-third) was removed by the 91st Constitutional Amendment.
Answer: Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is incorrect — nominated members who join a party after expiry of 6 months from date of nomination are covered by the anti-defection law.
With reference to the case of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, which of the following is correct?
Answer: The Supreme Court struck down Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule (which had barred court jurisdiction) as unconstitutional because it violated the basic structure — specifically the principle of judicial review. However, the 10th Schedule as a whole was upheld as constitutionally valid.
Which of the following criteria qualifies a political party for recognition as a National Party by the Election Commission of India?
Answer: Any one of — (a) 6% valid votes in 4+ states + 4 Lok Sabha seats; (b) 2% of Lok Sabha seats from 3+ different states (currently 11 seats); (c) Recognised as state party in 4+ states.
Which section of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 deals with the registration of political parties with the Election Commission of India?
Answer: Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Parties must subscribe to the principles of sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, socialism, secularism and democracy.
With reference to Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh (2016), which of the following statements correctly states the ruling?
Answer: The Supreme Court held that a Speaker who is facing a notice of motion for their own removal cannot adjudicate on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker's authority to decide disqualification is suspended when a removal motion is pending, to avoid conflict of interest.
In a coalition government in India, parties typically come together on the basis of a:
Answer: Common Minimum Programme (CMP) — a negotiated document outlining agreed-upon minimum policy priorities of the coalition partners.
The Supreme Court's judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (February 2024) struck down the Electoral Bonds scheme primarily on the ground that:
Answer: It violated Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution — the right to freedom of speech and expression, which includes the voters' right to receive information about political funding. The anonymity of donors under the scheme denied voters the information necessary to make informed electoral choices.
11. Mains PYQs
"The Anti-Defection Law has failed to prevent political defections. Critically examine." (250 words)
Approach: Explain the 10th Schedule and its objectives (curbing Aaya Ram Gaya Ram politics; ensuring legislative stability). Examine failures — engineered splits (before 91st Amendment), delays by Speakers, partisan Speakers deciding cases, merger loophole abused (Shiv Sena 2022, AIADMK), individual defections with floor tests (S.R. Bommai principles), Nabam Rebia scenario. Acknowledge successes — reduced floor-crossing, strengthened parties, stable governments. Way forward: time-bound decisions by Speaker (Keisham Meghachandra Singh 2020); independent tribunal replacing Speaker; Election Commission's role; stricter merger norms. Balance: constitutional provisions and practical realities.
"The Electoral Bonds scheme has been struck down by the Supreme Court. Examine the implications for electoral financing in India." (250 words)
Approach: Brief background of Electoral Bonds (Finance Act 2017, anonymous donations to parties through SBI). SC judgment — Association for Democratic Reforms 2024 — Art. 19(1)(a) violation. Implications: (1) Positive — greater transparency, voters' right to know upheld; (2) Negative — opacity may return through cash donations, unaccounted funds; (3) Need for alternative reform — state funding, Electoral Trust scheme, enhanced disclosure norms; (4) Corporate accountability — companies may revert to informal routes. Quote 2nd ARC and Indrajit Gupta Committee on state funding. Suggest: proportional state funding based on vote share, mandatory audit, ECI-supervised fund.
"Coalition governments have become a feature of Indian democracy. Examine their impact on governance and political stability." (250 words)
Approach: India's experience — 1977 to present; chronology of major coalitions. Positive impacts: broader representation, federalism strengthened (regional parties gain central importance), consensus politics. Negative impacts: policy paralysis (Left blocking nuclear deal, FDI), horse trading, portfolio allocation based on coalition arithmetic not merit, collective responsibility weakens, CMP vague. Case studies: UPA-I (FDI vetoed by Left), UPA-II (2G scam — DMK's portfolio), NDA-2024 (TDP, JD(U) leverage). Constitutional angle: Art. 75(3) — collective responsibility to LS. S.R. Bommai on floor test. Way forward: anti-defection enforcement, constructive vote of no-confidence (German model), electoral reforms for stable majority.
"Pressure groups play an important role in a democracy. Examine with reference to India." (150 words)
Approach: Define pressure groups; distinguish from political parties (no desire for political power, narrow interests). Positive role — interest articulation (BMS for labour rights, FICCI for business reforms), checking government (PIL by ADR on electoral transparency), supplementing legislative process, educating public. Examples: farmers' protests (2020–21) leading to withdrawal of Farm Laws; environmental groups (Chipko movement's influence); trade unions in securing minimum wage revisions. Critical role in India: PIL as tool (Vishaka Guidelines from PIL). Criticism: narrow interests, unaccountable, corporate capture of bureaucracy, anomic groups (riots) undermine rule of law. Balance: regulated lobbying (as in USA), transparency in funding, code of conduct for pressure groups. Conclusion: essential for democracy but need accountability framework.
12. Revision Box — 4 Critical UPSC Traps
Must-Remember — Anti-Defection, Parties & Pressure Groups
- Merger = 2/3, NOT 1/3: The 1/3 "split" provision (original Para 3) was removed by the 91st Amendment 2003. Now only a genuine merger supported by at least 2/3 of the legislature party members is an exception. There is NO split exception anymore. Students confuse 1/3 (old, removed) with 2/3 (current, merger).
- Kihoto Hollohan — Speaker IS subject to judicial review (Para 7 struck down): Para 7 was struck down as unconstitutional. The Speaker's final decision IS subject to SC/HC review — but only on limited grounds (mala fide, perversity, natural justice violation). The 10th Schedule itself was upheld. Do NOT say courts have no jurisdiction over defection matters.
- National Party: 2% LS seats from MINIMUM 3 different states: The number is currently 11 seats (2% of 543). Students confuse: (a) the 6% route requires 4 states; (b) the 2% route requires only 3 states. These are two different routes. Also, 2% from 3 states does NOT mean 6% from 3 states.
- Electoral Bonds struck down February 2024 — Art. 19(1)(a) ground: The ground was the right to information of voters — not privacy of donors or corporate rights. The SC said voters need to know who funds parties to make informed choices. Do NOT say it was struck down on grounds of equality or economic policy.
- 52nd Amendment 1985: Added 10th Schedule (Anti-Defection Law) — Rajiv Gandhi govt
- Kihoto Hollohan 1992: Para 7 struck down; 10th Schedule upheld; Speaker's decisions subject to SC/HC review
- 91st Amendment 2003: Para 3 removed — split exception abolished; only 2/3 merger allowed
- Nabam Rebia 2016: Speaker facing removal notice cannot decide disqualification petitions
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh 2020: SC directed Speaker to decide petition within 4 weeks — first deadline
- Subhash Desai 2023: Maharashtra crisis — Governor's action wrong; Speaker to decide
- Electoral Bonds struck down Feb 2024: Art. 19(1)(a) — voters' right to information
Almond's Typology: Institutional (Bureaucracy, Military) → Associational (Trade Unions, Business, Professional, Peasant) → Anomic (Spontaneous, unorganised).
