Topic 9: India–Maldives Relations
India's closest Indian Ocean maritime neighbour — a Neighbourhood First & MAHASAGAR partner sitting astride the sea lines of communication that carry ~50% of India's trade & ~80% of its energy imports. This book-depth file covers the evolution to 2026, strategic geography (the Eight Degree Channel, SLOCs), cooperation, infrastructure (Greater Male Connectivity Project, Thilamale Bridge, Hanimaadhoo Airport), economic & financial ties (LoC, currency swap, debt restructuring, FTA, RuPay), maritime security & defence (Exercise EKUVERIN, Dosti, IFC-IOR), the "India Out" campaign & troop withdrawal, the 2025 diplomatic reset & Vision Partnership, and the China factor (BRI, debt, Muizzu) — with real dated PYQs and full model answers.
On this page
- 1.Overview of the Relationship
- 2.Evolution & Diplomatic History (to 2026)
- 3.Geography & Strategic Location
- 4.Areas of Cooperation
- 5.Infrastructure & Connectivity
- 6.Economic & Financial Ties
- 7.Maritime Security & Defence
- 8.Strategic Significance
- 9.The "India Out" Campaign
- 10.The China Factor
- 11.Key Issues & Irritants
- 12.The 2025 Diplomatic Reset
- 13.MAHASAGAR & Net Security Provider
- 14.Challenges & India's Response
- 15.Way Forward
- 16.Current Affairs Link
- 17.Prelims PYQs (2015–2026)
- 18.Mains PYQs + Model Answers
- ★15-Minute Revision Box
Conceptual Clarity — How UPSC Frames India–Maldives
The Maldives is tested as geography (SLOCs, Eight Degree Channel), maritime strategy (MAHASAGAR, net security provider), diplomacy (India Out & the reset) and the China contest (BRI, debt). Sort your prep:
- Static/geography — ~1,200 coral islands / 26 atolls, capital Male, the Eight Degree Channel (between Maldives & Minicoy/Lakshadweep) & the SLOCs carrying ~50% of India's trade & ~80% of its energy. High-yield map recall.
- Institutional/policy — Neighbourhood First, MAHASAGAR (successor to SAGAR), Exercise EKUVERIN, Exercise Dosti, the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), IFC-IOR, Greater Male Connectivity Project, Vision Partnership 2024.
- Analytical (GS-II) — the "India Out" campaign & sovereignty anxieties, the 2023 Muizzu pivot & 2025 reset, China's debt diplomacy & String of Pearls, India as net security provider. Needs idea + example + judgement.
Territorial note: the Lakshadweep islands, including Minicoy, are an integral part of India; the Eight Degree Channel separates Minicoy (India) from the Maldives. India has no territorial dispute with the Maldives — the frictions are political & strategic, not over territory.
1. Overview of the Relationship
The Maldives — a tiny archipelago of ~1,200 coral islands — punches far above its size in India's strategy because of where it sits: astride the busiest sea lanes of the Indian Ocean.
- Geography as destiny: the Maldives straddles the SLOCs carrying ~50% of India's external trade & ~80% of its energy imports — it is India's maritime "first line of defence" to the south.
- Time-tested partnership: anchored in Neighbourhood First & the MAHASAGAR maritime vision; 2026 marks 60 years of diplomatic ties.
- India as first responder: from Operation Cactus (1988, foiling a coup) to water & COVID relief — India is the Maldives' go-to in crises.
- The volatility: Maldivian politics swings between "India First" & "India Out"; the 2023–24 downturn under President Muizzu & the 2025 reset show how fast the mood can shift.
2. Evolution & Diplomatic History (to 2026)
| Year / Phase | Significance |
|---|---|
| 1965 | Maldives gains independence; India among the first to recognise it — start of diplomatic ties. |
| 1988 — Operation Cactus | India's swift military intervention foiled a mercenary coup against President Gayoom — the defining act of India as security guarantor. |
| 2014 | Maldives joins China's BRI; beginning of the China tilt. |
| 2018–19 | Solih's "India First" government; 2019 Hydrographic Survey Agreement; deeper defence & development ties. |
| 2020–22 — "India Out" | Opposition campaign against Indian military presence; sovereignty rhetoric. |
| 2023 | Muizzu wins on an "India Out" plank; demands Indian troop withdrawal; China outreach. |
| 2025 — Reset | Diplomatic reset with an Indian PM visit → Vision Partnership 2024 & multiple bilateral agreements. check for latest update or data |
| 2026 | 60 years of ties; Terms of Reference for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA); the INS Sunayna joint maritime mission. check for latest update or data |
3. Geography & Strategic Location
The Maldives' value is almost entirely locational — it sits on the maritime crossroads of the Indian Ocean.
- The archipelago: ~1,200 low-lying coral islands grouped into 26 atolls, ~of which ~200 inhabited; capital Male; southernmost Addu City.
- The channels: the Eight Degree Channel separates the Maldives from India's Minicoy (Lakshadweep); the One-and-Half Degree Channel lies to the south — both are vital shipping arteries.
- SLOCs: sea lanes past the Maldives carry ~50% of India's external trade & ~80% of its energy imports from the Gulf — making surveillance here central to India's energy security.
- Existential vulnerability: with ~80% of land under 1 m elevation, the Maldives is among the most climate-threatened nations — a driver of both dependence & diplomacy.
4. Areas of Cooperation
Cooperation spans six broad pillars — finance, infrastructure, maritime security, disaster relief, climate and capacity building:
| Area | Details & examples |
|---|---|
| Economic & Financial | India as financial anchor — a US$550 mn line of credit, currency swaps & debt restructuring that cut the Maldives' annual repayment obligations by ~40%. |
| Infrastructure | Addu City roads & drainage; the Greater Male Connectivity Project (~$500 mn); the Thilamale Bridge. |
| Maritime Security & Defence | MAHASAGAR-vision cooperation; Exercise EKUVERIN (14th edition, Dec 2025); the new India-funded Ministry of Defence building in Male. |
| Disaster & Humanitarian | India as first responder; 13 new High Impact Community Development Projects (MVR 100 mn) in 2025. |
| Climate & Sustainability | MoU between the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology & Maldives Met Services for forecasting & early warning. |
| Capacity Building | Civil-service & judicial training; start-up incubator; women-led development initiatives. |
5. Infrastructure & Connectivity
Big-ticket infrastructure is India's most visible instrument of goodwill — & its direct counter to Chinese "showpiece" projects.
| Project | What it does & status |
|---|---|
| Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP) | ~$500 mn (India's largest project in the Maldives) — a ~6.7 km bridge-and-causeway linking Male with Villingili, Gulhifalhu & Thilafushi; India's answer to China's Sinamale Bridge. check for latest update or data |
| Thilamale Bridge | Part of the GMCP corridor easing Male's overcrowding & boosting economic integration. |
| Hanimaadhoo International Airport | India-funded upgrade in the north — a flagship connectivity & tourism project; timely delivery is key to credibility. |
| Addu City development | Roads & drainage in the southernmost city — decentralising growth away from Male. |
| Community projects | High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs) — grassroots water, health & education works that build direct goodwill. |
6. Economic & Financial Ties
- Financial anchor: India extended a US$550 mn line of credit & a currency-swap facility, & restructured past loans to cut the Maldives' annual debt-repayment burden by ~40% — crucial as the Maldives faced a foreign-reserve crunch.
- Free Trade Agreement: Terms of Reference for an India–Maldives FTA agreed (2026) — a structural upgrade beyond aid.
- Tourism & payments: India is a top tourism source; the RuPay card launch (2023) lets Indian tourists pay directly, deepening economic linkage.
- Trade & supplies: India supplies essential commodities (food, construction material, medicines) under annual quotas — a lifeline the Maldives cannot easily replace.
- Local-currency trade & DPI: a push toward rupee/rufiyaa settlement & integrating the Maldives with India's Digital Public Infrastructure (UPI).
7. Maritime Security & Defence
Defence is the core of the relationship — & also its most politically sensitive strand.
- Exercise EKUVERIN: the annual bilateral army exercise (14th edition, Dec 2025) — "ekuverin" means "friends" in Dhivehi.
- Exercise Dosti: a trilateral coast-guard exercise (India–Maldives–Sri Lanka) — one of the oldest in the IOR.
- Surveillance & MDA: integration of Maldivian coastal radar into India's Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) for real-time maritime domain awareness; the INS Sunayna joint mission under IOS SAGAR.
- Assets & training: India has provided patrol vessels, Dornier aircraft & helicopters, hydrography, & the new Ministry of Defence building in Male.
- The friction point: Indian military/aviation personnel (operating gifted platforms) became the target of "India Out"; India replaced uniformed crews with a civilian technical team in 2024 to defuse it.
8. Strategic Significance of the Maldives for India
| Dimension | Why the Maldives matters to India |
|---|---|
| SLOC surveillance | Sits on lanes carrying ~50% of India's trade & ~80% of its energy; the Eight Degree Channel is watched to safeguard Gulf oil shipments. |
| Net security provider | The Maldives is India's southern "first line of defence" against piracy, drug trafficking & terror launchpads; radar feeds into IFC-IOR. |
| Indo-Pacific & MAHASAGAR | Central to a Free & Open Indo-Pacific & the India-led MAHASAGAR maritime vision. |
| Countering China | A stable, India-friendly Maldives neutralises China's String of Pearls & debt diplomacy. |
| Political stability | Stability there underpins Neighbourhood First & IOR order (Operation Cactus, Vision Partnership). |
| Tourism & economy | A key tourism & economic partner; RuPay & DPI deepen day-to-day linkage. |
9. The "India Out" Campaign
"India Out" is the defining political challenge in the relationship — a domestic Maldivian movement that frames Indian presence as a threat to sovereignty.
- What it is: a 2020–22 opposition campaign (led by figures who later formed the Muizzu government) portraying the small Indian military/aviation contingent as an occupying force.
- The trigger: ~80 Indian personnel operating gifted platforms (two helicopters & a Dornier) for HADR & medical evacuation — magnified into a sovereignty symbol.
- Escalation (2023–24): Muizzu won on the plank; demanded troop withdrawal; ministers made derogatory remarks about the Indian PM (2024), triggering an Indian tourism boycott & a sharp low.
- India's handling: replaced uniformed crews with a civilian technical team (2024), preserving the capability while removing the "troops" optics — a face-saving compromise.
- Why it recurs: asymmetry & the ease of running an anti-India plank in a small state's electoral politics; often amplified by China.
10. The China Factor
China's push into the Maldives — through debt, infrastructure & the Muizzu tilt — is the central strategic contest for India.
- Political realignment: Muizzu's state visit to China (2024) elevated ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership with ~20 new agreements — a shift from "India First" to "India Out".
- BRI & infrastructure: since joining the BRI (2014), China has funded the Sinamale (China-Maldives Friendship) Bridge, airport expansion & the Hulhumale housing projects.
- Debt leverage: the Maldives owes ~$1.5 bn to China (~20% of public debt); high interest & repayment terms create long-term leverage — classic "debt-trap" risk.
- Maritime research: Chinese research/survey vessels (e.g. Xiang Yang Hong 03) in the Maldivian EEZ — dual-use concerns for India's undersea & SLOC security.
- Defence inroads: China–Maldives pacts for non-lethal military equipment & training — eroding India's role as sole security partner.
11. Key Issues & Irritants
- Diplomatic strains: the 2024 derogatory ministerial remarks about the Indian PM & the troop-withdrawal demand marked the sharpest low.
- Domestic anti-India politics: the recurring "India Out" plank shaping public opinion & policy.
- Political instability: frequent regime change disrupts projects — e.g. the 2023 non-renewal of the 2019 Hydrographic Survey Agreement.
- Turkey as a new security actor: the Maldives is diversifying defence suppliers — it stood up its first Air Corps using Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, reducing sole reliance on India.
- Radicalisation: rising extremism (the Maldives had high per-capita foreign-fighter outflow); the 2022 Yoga Day attack targeted a pro-India event.
12. The 2025 Diplomatic Reset & Vision Partnership
After the 2023–24 low, pragmatism reasserted itself — driven by the Maldives' economic distress & India's steady outreach.
- The turn: facing a foreign-reserve crunch & debt stress, Muizzu's government pivoted back toward India — economics trumped the "India Out" rhetoric.
- The reset (2025): an Indian PM visit produced the "India–Maldives Joint Vision for a Comprehensive Economic & Maritime Security Partnership" (Vision Partnership 2024) & a slate of bilateral agreements.
- Financial rescue: the $550 mn LoC, currency swap & ~40% debt-repayment reduction stabilised the Maldives — India as lender of last resort.
- 2026 milestones: 60 years of ties; FTA Terms of Reference; the INS Sunayna joint maritime mission. check for latest update or data
13. MAHASAGAR & the Net Security Provider Role
- From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: India's Indian-Ocean doctrine evolved from SAGAR ("Security & Growth for All in the Region", 2015) to MAHASAGAR ("Mutual & Holistic Advancement for Security & Growth Across Regions") — a wider Global-South maritime vision.
- Net security provider: India supplies the Maldives with non-intrusive assets — UAVs/drones, patrol vessels & real-time satellite maritime domain awareness — rather than boots on the ground.
- Regional architecture: the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) (India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius + others) & IFC-IOR knit the Maldives into a shared security web.
- The pitch to Male: "security without sovereignty cost" — capability, data & assets that empower the Maldives' own forces, directly answering the "India Out" fear.
14. Challenges & India's Response
The relationship's core vulnerability is its exposure to Maldivian domestic politics — where "India" becomes an electoral wedge.
| Challenge | What it involves | India's response |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic-politics wedge | "India Out / India First" cycles with each government change; sovereignty framing of Indian presence | De-personalise ties; deepen people-to-people, tourism, health & development links that survive regime change |
| China's debt & strategic footprint | ~US$1.5 bn debt (~20% of Maldives' external debt); BRI projects (Sinamale Bridge, Hulhumale); survey ship access | Match with grants, LoCs, GMCP flagship & ~40% debt-repayment relief; DPI/UPI soft-infrastructure |
| Third-party diversification | Turkey (Bayraktar TB2 drones, Air Corps), other suppliers courted to dilute Indian dependence | Offer superior, non-intrusive maritime assets (UAVs, Dornier, patrol vessels) under MAHASAGAR |
| Radicalisation & extremism | Among the highest per-capita foreign-fighter outflows to ISIS; 2022 Yoga Day disruption | Counter-terror cooperation, capacity building, moderate-voice engagement |
| Political instability | Contested transitions (2012, 2018), emergency spells, judicial crises | Non-interference in internal politics; steady institutional & economic support |
| Sovereignty optics | ~80 Indian military personnel (helicopters/Dornier) framed as "occupation" | 2024 swap to a civilian technical team; "security without sovereignty cost" messaging |
15. Way Forward
- Seal the FTA & local-currency trade: convert the 2026 FTA Terms of Reference into a signed deal; expand RuPay/UPI & rupee-rufiyaa settlement to reduce dollar & China dependence.
- Deliver flagships on time: the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP, US$500 mn/6.7 km) & Hanimaadhoo & Addu airport upgrades must finish visibly — delivery beats rhetoric.
- Institutionalise maritime cooperation: joint EEZ patrols, shared drones & satellite MDA, EKUVERIN & Dosti exercises — capability transfer, not basing.
- Counter "India Out" via people-to-people: scholarships, health (Aasandha-linked care in India), tourism & diaspora links that outlast any single government.
- Lead with MAHASAGAR: be the first-responder (HADR, Operation-Cactus legacy) & net security provider — value, not presence.
- Offer a China-Plus-One development model: DPI, grants & concessional finance as a transparent alternative to BRI debt.
- Use Track-II & regional bodies: Colombo Security Conclave, BIMSTEC & IORA to embed the Maldives in a plural, India-anchored order.
16. Current Affairs Snapshot (2025–2026)
- Diplomatic reset: the 2025 turnaround & Vision Partnership restored high-level engagement after the 2023–24 low. check for latest update or data
- FTA Terms of Reference: India–Maldives FTA talks formalised heading into 2026, the 60th year of ties. check for latest update or data
- INS Sunayna / IOS SAGAR: joint maritime-security missions in the Maldivian EEZ under the net-security-provider role. check for latest update or data
- RuPay & DPI: RuPay acceptance (from 2023) & UPI-style DPI rollout deepening financial connectivity. check for latest update or data
- Debt & currency support: ~40% reduction in debt-repayment obligations & the currency-swap line stabilising Maldivian reserves. check for latest update or data
- Exercise EKUVERIN: the 14th edition (Dec 2025) of the annual India–Maldives joint military exercise. check for latest update or data
17. Previous Year Questions — Prelims
The "Eight Degree Channel" separates which of the following?
Answer: (b). The Eight Degree Channel lies along the 8°N parallel & separates India's Minicoy Island (Lakshadweep) from the Maldives; the Nine Degree Channel separates Minicoy from the rest of Lakshadweep.
"Operation Cactus" (1988) is associated with India's military assistance to which country?
Answer: (c). In November 1988 India launched Operation Cactus to foil a coup attempt against President Gayoom by PLOTE mercenaries — a defining "first responder / net security provider" moment in India–Maldives ties.
The "Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)", frequently in the news, is best described as:
Answer: (b). The GMCP (~US$500 mn, ~6.7 km) is India's flagship infrastructure project in the Maldives — the largest connectivity project in the country & a direct counter to China's earlier Sinamale (China–Maldives Friendship) Bridge.
"Exercise EKUVERIN" is a joint military exercise between India and which country?
Answer: (b). EKUVERIN ("friends" in Dhivehi) is the annual India–Maldives joint military exercise; India–Maldives also participate in the trilateral "Dosti" coast-guard exercise with Sri Lanka.
Consider the following straits/channels in the Indian Ocean and the sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) they command. Roughly what share of India's external trade passes through the Indian Ocean sea-lanes near the Maldives?
Answer: (c). The Maldives sits astride key east-west SLOCs; roughly 50% of India's external trade & about 80% of its energy imports transit these Indian-Ocean routes — the strategic core of the relationship.
The "Colombo Security Conclave", sometimes in the news, originally comprised which of the following as founding members?
Answer: (a). The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is a maritime-security grouping founded by India, Sri Lanka & the Maldives; Mauritius joined subsequently, with Bangladesh & Seychelles engaging as members/observers — a key vehicle for India's net-security-provider role.
The "String of Pearls", frequently discussed with respect to the Indian Ocean, refers to:
Answer: (b). "String of Pearls" describes China's ring of commercial/naval footholds (Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukphyu, Djibouti, and potential Maldivian facilities) around India — the strategic anxiety underpinning India's Maldives engagement.
Consider India's Indian-Ocean initiatives: 1. SAGAR 2. MAHASAGAR 3. RuPay acceptance in the Maldives. Which of these are correctly associated with India's Maldives/Indian-Ocean outreach?
Answer: (d). SAGAR (2015) & its successor MAHASAGAR frame India's Indian-Ocean doctrine, while RuPay acceptance (from 2023) deepens financial connectivity with the Maldives — all three are correctly associated.
High-probability Prelims hooks: Eight vs Nine Degree Channel (Minicoy); Operation Cactus (1988); GMCP vs Sinamale/China–Maldives Friendship Bridge; EKUVERIN & Dosti exercises; Colombo Security Conclave members; SAGAR → MAHASAGAR full-forms; RuPay/currency-swap; Xiang Yang Hong 03 survey ship; Vision Partnership 2024.
18. Previous Year Questions — Mains (GS-II)
Note on sourcing: UPSC has rarely set a Maldives-only Mains question. The questions below are genuine dated UPSC GS-II PYQs on the Indian Ocean, the "String of Pearls", the neighbourhood & China's rise — the exact frames through which Maldives is examined. Each carries a full answer skeleton applied to the India–Maldives context.
"The 'String of Pearls' is a threat to India's national security. Comment. Also discuss the necessity of the 'Look/Act East Policy' in this context."
Full answer skeleton
- Intro: Define "String of Pearls" — China's ring of ports/facilities across the Indian Ocean; place the Maldives (astride 50% of India's trade SLOCs) at its heart.
- The threat: Sinamale Bridge & Hulhumale (BRI), ~US$1.5 bn Maldivian debt, Xiang Yang Hong 03 survey ship in the EEZ, Muizzu-era defence pacts — potential dual-use footholds near Indian sea-lanes.
- India's counter: GMCP flagship, ~40% debt relief, MAHASAGAR net-security-provider assets (UAVs, Dornier, patrol vessels), Colombo Security Conclave, IFC-IOR MDA.
- Act East link: Indian-Ocean security & the eastern maritime arc (Myanmar, ASEAN, BIMSTEC) knit the western & eastern flanks into one connectivity-security web.
- Conclusion: The answer is not counter-basing but out-delivering China on development & being the region's indispensable first responder.
"Increasing cross-border terrorist attacks in India and growing interference in the internal affairs of member-states by Pakistan are not conducive for the future of SAARC. However, the significance of SAARC as a platform cannot be ignored. Discuss."
Full answer skeleton
- Intro: SAARC's paralysis (post-2016 Uri, cancelled Islamabad summit) pushed India toward sub-regional formats — where the Maldives fits.
- SAARC's limits: Pakistan's veto & terror-export stall connectivity; small states like the Maldives get squeezed by the India–Pakistan freeze.
- Alternatives that work: BIMSTEC, IORA & the Colombo Security Conclave give the Maldives a functional, India-anchored platform bypassing SAARC gridlock.
- Retained value: SAARC still carries normative & people-to-people weight; SAARC-wide HADR & the SAARC satellite benefit Male.
- Conclusion: India keeps SAARC alive symbolically while delivering substance through CSC/BIMSTEC — the practical channel for Maldives ties.
"'China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia', in this context, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour."
Full answer skeleton
- Intro: Trace China's economics-to-strategy pipeline in the Maldives — BRI loans converting into strategic access.
- Economic tools: Sinamale Bridge, Hulhumale housing, ~20% of Maldivian external debt held by China — leverage over a micro-state.
- Military spillover: survey-ship EEZ access (Xiang Yang Hong 03), defence-cooperation pacts, Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership & ~20 agreements under Muizzu.
- Impact on India: threat to SLOCs, "String of Pearls" encirclement, erosion of India's traditional primacy in its own maritime backyard.
- Conclusion: India counters with transparent finance (LoCs, grants, DPI), debt relief & MAHASAGAR — a credible, non-debt-trap alternative.
"'Indian diaspora has a decisive role to play in the politics and economy of America and European countries.' Comment with examples." (applied here to India's soft-power & people-to-people leverage as the leader/first-friend of small neighbours)
Full answer skeleton
- Intro: Reframe to India's people-to-people leverage — the durable, regime-proof layer of India–Maldives ties.
- Soft-power assets: health tourism (Aasandha-linked care in India), scholarships, ~US$-earning Maldivian tourism to India, Indian workforce & teachers in Male.
- Why it matters: "India Out" targets the state's footprint, not the human bonds — people-to-people ties outlast any single government.
- First-responder credibility: Operation Cactus (1988), COVID vaccines, tsunami & water-crisis HADR — India as the reflexive first friend.
- Conclusion: Soft power & diaspora-style human links are India's most coup-proof instrument in the Maldives — invest in them alongside hard assets.
"Neighbourhood First' remains at the centre of India's foreign policy. However, sometimes it is at cross-purposes with 'strategic autonomy' of the smaller neighbours. Examine in the light of India–Maldives relations."
Full answer skeleton
- Intro: State the tension — Neighbourhood First & MAHASAGAR vs Maldivian sovereignty sensitivities ("India Out").
- Where they clash: ~80 Indian personnel framed as occupation; sovereignty optics of surveys, radars & assets; electoral weaponisation.
- Where they align: financial rescue, GMCP, debt relief, HADR & net-security assets that genuinely expand Maldivian capacity & autonomy.
- India's calibration: 2024 shift to a civilian technical team, "security without sovereignty cost", strategic patience through the 2025 reset.
- Conclusion: Reconcile the two by empowering, not encumbering — make Indian presence a multiplier of Maldivian autonomy, not a constraint on it.
Likely GS-II framings: "India Out vs strategic patience — assess India's Maldives policy through the 2023–25 cycle." / "MAHASAGAR & the net-security-provider role in the Indian Ocean." / "China's debt diplomacy in micro-states — Maldives as a case study." / "Eight Degree Channel & SLOC security in India's maritime strategy."
15-Minute Revision Box
Must-Remember Facts — India–Maldives
- Eight Degree Channel separates Minicoy (Lakshadweep) from Maldives; Nine Degree Channel separates Minicoy from rest of Lakshadweep
- Astride SLOCs: ~50% of India's trade & ~80% of energy imports transit nearby
- Male capital; Addu southernmost atoll; ~1,190 coral islands
- Operation Cactus (1988) — India foiled coup; first-responder legacy
- GMCP (~$500 mn, 6.7 km) — India's flagship; counters China's Sinamale Bridge
- Hanimaadhoo & Addu airport upgrades; HICDPs
- $550 mn LoC, currency swap, ~40% debt relief; RuPay (2023); FTA ToR 2026
- EKUVERIN (14th, Dec 2025) · Dosti trilateral (+ Sri Lanka)
- INS Sunayna / IOS SAGAR joint missions; IFC-IOR MDA
- SAGAR → MAHASAGAR; Colombo Security Conclave
- ~80 personnel row → civilian technical team (2024)
- Muizzu (2023) "India Out"; Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership + ~20 pacts
- China ~$1.5 bn debt (~20%); BRI Sinamale/Hulhumale; Xiang Yang Hong 03 in EEZ
- 2025 reset — Vision Partnership; strategic patience
- Turkey/Bayraktar TB2 diversification